The Constitutional Court of Republic of Indonesia is centralized judicial review institution which implements a posteriori and abstract control. Constitutional court decision often politically sensitive and involve important issues. On the one hand handing down strong decisions that uphold important constitutional principles can bring great benefits to citizens and can strengthen support for democracy but on the other hand, strong role of the court in judicial review tends to encroach increasingly on the territory of the law making institution. This article examines the decision of constitutional court in the framework of a tension between constitutionalism and democracy, especially from theoretical or conceptual approach. As result of examining its decisions, Indonesian Constitutional Court may reflect two characters; judicial activism as characterized by acting as law-maker and using policy in judicial decisions and/ or judicial self-restraint. Recent Indonesian experience shows that judicial review of legislation is not a simply of judicial control over law-making institution, as it brings tension in the context of power relations in the scheme of separation of power. Relationship between the court and legislature, in respective of judicial review, will culminate in the philosophy of the judiciary. However, as constitutionalism and democracy are virtue, decisions of the Constitutional Court in judicial review should create mode of self-limitation within the framework of the principle of separation of powers. Keywords: Constitutional Court; Judicial Review; Judicial Activism; Judicial Self-Restraint. 
Introduction
Judicial review has its roots on the principle of constitutional supremacy and constitutionalism. From the constitutional supremacy point of view, the any law under the Constitution shall not be contradictory to the Constitution.
Therefore, there should be a mechanism to review the constitutionality of a law (the constitutionality of legislation). In constitutionalism perspective, the limitation of power is imposed. The limitation means that the absence of control mechanism on the legislature tends to the abuse of power, thus, the situation could contribute the possibility of making laws in contrary to the norms of the constitution.
1 On the other issue, the constitutionalism also means the recognitions of the human rights which have consequences for the enforcement of those rights by an independent judiciary, including the protection from existence of Laws that could harm the human rights.
Although judicial review stands on the principle of constitutional supremacy and constitutionalism, in a constitutional democracy state, the judicial review always raises the normative question of two things; namely institutional legitimacy and how these institutions should be run. Furthermore, in the context of constitutional democracy, the judicial review has placed the Constitutional Court as a superior institution in control relations of the branches of legislative and executive power. consequences to the development of the role of judicial power to conduct further justice that overstepping powers and authorities, which has been the political domain of the executive power and legislative power.
2 In particular publishes a controversial provocative issues, namely the coup on the courtroom (coup de'tat in the courtroom), with the main article from Alec Stone Sweet, describing the phenomenon of widespread and more powerful judiciary. Describes such phenomon as "juristochracy", and Schepelle calls it as a "courtocracy" where in different countries, the constitutional reform has transformed the power of the representative bodies to the judicial institution by the recognition of human rights in the Constitution and the mechanism of judicial review. 3 The transformation in this case, has the meaning that the important public policies which originally was in the hands of the elected-agencies and made on the basis of consensus or majority decision was to be switched to the judiciary. 4 Such transformation was also shifting the concept of democracy, from the "majority rule" to the "realdemocracy", namely, the constitutional democracy as a shift of the "democracy governed predominantly by the principle of parliamentary sovereignty".
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To this extent, the judicial review, the interpretations and the Constitutional which the Ancient Greek distinguished as "nomos" and "psphisma". "Nomoi"
in the modern Constitution, in some aspects, is the Constitution in present days, as the substances are the state organization and procedures to make and change "nomoi" need complex and difficult process. Whilts, "psphisma" should not be contradicted to "nomoi". In the medieval ages, the Roman law recognized the principle of "legibus solutus", which means that the King is above the law and therefore is immune to the law. However, in its evolution, the Roman Law recognized the principle that the King is subject to the Law, which was known as "princeps legibus tenetur". Furthermore, in the middle ages, the natural law school distinguished two types of norms, the jus naturale, which was superior and jus positivum, which applied if not conflicted to the jus naturale. The such norms doctrine has put the framework of the institutional method in order to determine whether or not the norms are contrary to others within the hierarchy of norm system. The French Constitution of 1799, 1852, 1946 and 1958 has set the control over the norms in the Legislation, though, it is always exercised through the political and non-judiciary mechanism. However, the practice of norms control by the judiciary had actually taken place in the long-regime of French, where the Parlement, as the Highest Court was only established in some of the cities in
France, stated that they have the authority to conduct judicial review of all the rules against 6 "the fundamental laws of the realm". 7 French, starting on revolution era of 1789, had chosen a strict model separation of powers which did not grant the Court to have certain power to intervene the parliament as lawmakers. 8 Since then, called it as the "French ideology", which means that "in the representative government parliament is the only legitimate organs to express popular will". 13 Stated that such situation as the "constitutional model" as opposed to the "parliamentary model" because the Parliament is no longer "sovereign" or "Supreme" since the legislation should not be contrary to the Constitution. 14 On the basis of the separation of power, the nature of reviewing Laws remain as a form of the judicial intervention against the law making power. Therefore, the judicial review is considered having political aspects. In the Kelsenian perspective, the ordinary courts judges, such as a judicial review in the United States, should not conduct judicial review since the judges shall accept and apply the Laws made by the representative bodies.
The Austrian model of constitutional review also referred to the "Continental model", "a centralized model" or "kelsenian model" which is based on the model developed by Kelsen in 1919 becomes an institution which is considered to be able to answer the question within the doctrine of separation of power. Kelsenian model, provides at least two interests institutional which touches upon the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication, namely: a. the division and balance of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and b. the composition of constitutional courts. 15 In the context of both interests, explained that the presence of the court placed as a model beyond Trias politica, since accordingly, the Court "has to supervise the constitutional boundaries between constitutional institutions, including those of the judiciary". This view is reflected from almost all models of the constitutional court in Europe, which is marked by the model of judges recruitments which has to involve the three branches of Trias politica scheme.
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In the theoretical perspective, the Kelsenian model of judicial review can be seen from three arguments; first, the consequences of the doctrine of separation (2013) 4) A special Commission. In the last model, the special Commission which has nomination character or selection character, but the decision is in the hands of the representative bodies (the parliament).
19
For example and comparison, the 16 Constitutional Court judges of the Federal German, are chosen by Bundestag and bundesrat, each appoints eight judges. The Constitutional court judges of Italy in total are 15, each of 1/3 are nominated by the President, the parliament and the Supreme court, where it is also the same as the Indonesian model. Second, the absence of doctrine "stare decisis".
The absence of such doctrine has to be followed by the judges in their decisions which have been resolved earlier in the similar case, as in the tradition of "common law", has made the judicial review requires the special and single institution to ensure the consistency of the decision and the law enforcement. Third, inaccuracies of the Court (ordinary court) as the institution reviewing constitutionality. The judicial review is essentially a constitutional question which not only about the dimensionless of law enforcement (applying law), but also including the value and the views of the Constitution as the abstract and fundamental norms. Consequently, the meaning of specialized and centralized is including the judge qualification and expertises in term of the "constitutional professionalism" which have functions to avoid the suspicion of being "political". 20 The judicial review on the constitutionality of the laws by judges needs sensibility of discretionary than just an activity of interpretation. Therefore, the judicial review has essential character of legislative rather than purely a judicial. 
Adjudication and Interpretation in the Judicial Review
The essence of judicial review of constitutionality of the law is a constitutional adjudication activity. The constitutional adjudication is essentially how the court works against the constitution. In other words, adjudication is about how judges decide or should decide cases in constitutional adjudication. Based on the principle of the judicial independence and the principle of impartiality, judicial review will never put the role of judges merely as a mouthpiece of the Laws. The adjudication for the constitutional review on the Legislation is even more giving unimpeded role to the judges to not only judging whether or not the Law is contrary to the Constitution but also interpreting the Constitution in order to examine the constitutionality of the Law. Therefore, the interpretation becomes the key in the judicial review of law, "If [the judge] views the role of the court as a passive one, he will be willing to delegate the responsibility for change, and he will not greatly care whether the delegated authority is exercised or not. If he views the court as an instrument of society designed to reflect in its decisions the morality of the community, he will be more likely to look precedent in the teeth and to measure it against the ideals and aspirations of his time".
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According to Schaefer (1996) , there are two stands regarding the position of judge in the constitutional adjudication. First, the passive stand tends to imply that other institutions have to take action or conduct changes. This first model has a tendency to a model of judicial self-restraint and stands on the view of departmentalism. Second, stand is the active stand on the ground that the judiciary is an important actor whose decision is an instrument for the community development. . 23 Walter V. Schaefer, 'Precedent and Policy ' (1996) 34 The University of Chicago Law Review.
24 ibid.
The result of this second stand is the model of active Court (judicial activism) based on principle of judicial supremacy in the constitutional adjudication. In the context of adjudication for the judicial review; it has always a political character since the judge does not only do the "law-finding" as said: "We must accordingly concede that judicial decision making is not only law-finding, but also also law-making.
The judge creates law in the process of finding a decision. Adjudication thus always has a political dimension too". 25 Having regards that the interpretation is an inherent activity in judicial review, the most important and fundamental question in constitutional interpretation is how the constitution will be interpreted. In other words, the judicial review does not merely about judging whether or not articles, clauses or verses in the Act are contrary to the Constitution, but even more applying the constitutional or constitutional principles. Therefore, judges shall also decide the meaning of the norms. At this point the constitution must always be interpreted to ensure that the legislation as a delegated-Constitution does not contradictory to the Constitution. Accordingly, in a constitutional adjudication, Justice Hughes states that "a constitution is without meaning until the judges pour meaning into its provisions". 26 One of the reasons of having constitutional interpretation is the constitution made in the period, momentum and context when the constitution is made. Consequently, the meaning of the constitution is not always the same as when it was made with its further development. If the meaning remains the same, then it requires at least a construction when being applied in judicial review. The third reason is that the dichotomist divides the interpretation of the constitution into two views: orginalism and non-originism.
The originalism as well as the non-originalism has its own reasons in the application. The arguments of those who agree to use originalism, according to quotes Ben Michaels as saying that "any interpretation of the Constitution that really is an interpretation .... Constitution originally meant". "On the issue of constitutional supremacy, when a judge takes an oath to uphold the Constitution, the judge swears... to carry out the intention of its framers". In this first reason, the constitution is considered as a "binding contract", so it is not to be distorted by the will of its framers. The second reason is that originalism limits the power of judges as the "unelected agency" in democracy. For this reason in the American context and in the context of democracy, it is based on the principle that decision making of public policy must be done by those who are accountable to the electorate.
The consequence in this matter is that all public affairs must be seriously and continuously debated in institutions with the electoral mandate, not by a judge who has no electoral basis.
On the contrary, the non-originalist advocates put forward reasons, first, the development of the constitution can be done through the interpretation and not solely through the amendment. The mechanism of the constitutional amendment which always requires a rigorous mechanism tends to make the constitution difficult to be changed. Second, the intent of the framers of the Constitution varies greatly and in the practice of constitutional drafting, the person or particular group chosen as the authoritative party in determining the intent to draft the provisions of the constitution not only means that there is one purpose otherwise many and possibly for the conflicting reasons when agreeing to a certain provision as the content of the constitution.
The originalism and the non-originalism are the two main approaches to constitutional interpretation. The method used in interpretation can be varied as it is the method of legal interpretation in general. The originalism and the non- 
a. Supremacy of the Judiciary
Judicial supremacy or jurisentric is actually a perspective and perception on position of the judiciary among other institutions in the constitutional system in terms of constitutional interpretation. Judicial supremacy means "Court is better suited to the task of principled constitutional interpretation than any other branch of government". 28 In a more moderate language, refers to it as a leadership in constitutional interpretation. This concept places the judiciary as a sole and monopolistic institution in the interpretation of the constitution so that other branches in the constitutional law system must in conformity with judicial laws it makes both the constitution and the law. called it as "pragmatic imperative", which means judiciary "... have considerably less expertise than the parliament, particularly on substantive matters of policy, so it should be that the authority [i.e. Parliament] itself should make such decisions because it is better equipped to do so". Another reason is the so-called "democratic imperative", meaning "that the electoral system operates as an important safeguard against the misuse of public power by requiring many public authorities to submit themselves to the verdict of the electorate at periodic intervals". The opposite of judicial supremacy is deparmentalism, which places the branches of government as equal institutions and each has the authority to interpret.
Whitthington in the context of US experiences refers "our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved the best practices and determinations of the other branches". Defines deparmentalism as "the most explicit and then perceived idea of the influence of the Departmentalism as" each branch, or department, of the government.
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Clear and affirmed view on departmentalism came from 16th President of the United
States of America Abraham Lincoln, in response to the decisions of Dred Scott's case:
"If the policy of the Government on vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in Criticism of the departmentalism is the possibility of legal chaos and the disrespect of the constitution because each has a basic authority and basic interpretation of the constitution. Hence the skeptical response to the views of departmentism is that the branches of state power can claim the truth of the interpretation of the constitution.
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The debate between judicial supremacy and departmentalism is always manifest in systems that recognize and embrace the judicial review of legislation.
This is also apparent in the constitutional adjudication by the Constitutional 
c. Popular Constitutionalism
Judicial supremacy considers that the judiciary is the most appropriate institution to be attached to the task of interpreting the constitution, while departmentalism acknowledge that every branch of power has an equal position and authority to perform constitutional interpretations, especially within its sphere of power. Popular constitutionalism is an idea that puts "people" as central in Final interpretive authority rested with "the people themselves" and courts no less than elected representatives were subordinate to their judgments". 39 Kramer's view moved from a conception of constitutionalism that differed in meaning in its development which then he considered that the final interpreter of the constitution was the people themselves. In detail defines popular constitutionalism as follows:
"Constitutionalism in the Founding era was different. Then, power to interpret (and not just the power to make) constitutional law was thought to reside with the people. And not theoretically or in the abstract, but in an active, ongoing sense. It was the community at large-not the judiciary, not any branch of the government-that controlled the meaning of the Constitution and was responsible for ensuring its proper implementation in the day-to-day process of governing. This is the notion I labeled "popular constitutionalism"-to distinguish it from "legal constitutionalism" or the idea that constitutional interpretation has been turned over to the judiciary and, in particular, to the Supreme Court".
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The popular idea of constitutionalism faces practical problem, namely the question of form of institutionalization of this idea, how to exercise constitutional interpretation by the people, and how "people" can be trusted as a final interpreter of the constitution. Although there are questions about how the implementation of this conception, popular constitutionalism essentially denies the supremacy of the judiciary by recognizing departmentalism but putting the final interpreter on the "people". 41 To make it easier to understand the different concepts of supremacy of the judiciary, departmentalism and Popular Constitutionalism, explains in the following:
42 Referring to the opinion of the Butt, the issue of judicial activism and the restriction of the judiciary must depart from the concept of originalism and non-originality. Since 1990 the term "judicial activism" and "judicial activist" has been discussed in 3,815
articles and reviews in various journals of law. Judicial activism and judicial restraint, relating to "how well they realize the judicial role of bridging the gap between law and society's changing reality and the role of protecting the constitution and its values". "is the judicial tendency -conscious or unconscious -to achieve the proper balance between conflicting social values (such as individual rights against the needs of the collective, the liberty of one person against that of another, the authority of one branch of government against another) through change in the existing law (invalidating an unconstitutional statute, invalidating secondary legislation that conflicts with a statute, reversing a judicial precedent) or through creating new law that did not previously exist (through interpreting the constitution or legislation, through developing the common law)". The opposite of judicial activism is the judicial restraint defined as the judicial tendency, conscious or unconscious, to achieve the proper balance between conflicting social values by preserving existing law rather than creating new law". 47 Posner classifies three aspects of judicial restrictions; deference, reticence and prudence.
"Deference" which literally means "relief" and "respect" means "avoiding contrasts with the decisions of other branches of government," while reticence means silence is defined as "assumption that judges should not be making policy decisions". 48 "The legislation is the result of an exercise by Conggress of the legislative power vested in it by the Constitution, and of the exercise by the President of his constitutional power in approving a bill and thereby making it 'a law'. To sustain it is to respect the action of two branch of our government directly responsible to the will of the people and enpowered the Constitution to determine the wisdom of legislation. The awesome of this Court to invalidate such legislation, because in practice it is bounded only by our own prudence in discerning the limits of the Court's Constitutional function, must be exerciced with the utmost restraint".
Judicial activism and judicial self-restraint approaches in the interpretation of the constitution have been relatively criticized. This means that it is no longer relevant to draw tight boundaries to totally reject one of them. Therefore, the most important of the judicial review is the adequate "legal reasoning" of the decision.
However, as matter of fact, I identified some decisions of Indonesian Constitutional
Court resonate the judicial activism: policy in judicial decision, decision formulating legal norms, and decision expands the power the constitutional court.
Conclusions
On the basis of constitutionalism and democracy, this article tries to formulate the proportional role of the Constitutional Court in the judicial review of the Laws as follows:
First, the classic and general principle of the annulment of the law is because it is clearly contrary to the Constitution (clear mistake). With such principles, judicial review emerges because of a real error in the contents of the legislation that contradict to the Constitution. The clear mistake concept could be used on expressly verbis against the constitution. However, the principle restricts that "clear mistake"
only results in the annulment, and has no consequence to regulate.
Secondly, on the constitutional issues that clearly delegated entirely to the legislator, which is often referred to as an open legal policy, the Constitutional Court should not overstep the legislative-regulatory zone as a result of the annulment. This means that the Constitutional Court retains the power to annul, but the Constitutional
Court has no right to regulate (making law), since the constitution clearly grants the power to the legislator. If the Constitutional Court is oriented to make Laws, it is not necessary to make a decision with a conditional interpretation model or the formulation of new norms, but the Court may only provide sufficient guidance on certain constitutional issues in the consideration of its decision. Moreover, the lawmakers will refine or make a new law with the suggestions according to the Court's decision. As a consequence of the third point, in the decision, the Constitutional Court shall explicitly submit its suggestions to the legislator.
Thirdly, as a consequence of the hierarchy of Laws and the consequences of the separation of powers, the Constitutional Court's decisions may not contain imperative order to lawmakers to enact law and to make a law with any substances determined by the Constitutional Court. However, this is different from the South African Constitutional Court which indeed in the Constitution authorizes the Constitutional Court to review the bill so that the Constitutional Court's decision becomes the basis of consideration of the substance of the law in the law making process. Similarly to the South African Court, the Hungarian Constitutional Court's authority is ex officio authorized initiating a case in situation of omission by the legislature. Therefore, its decision enforce the legislator to apply the decision in the law making process. The 1945 Constitution has separated powers to each of power holders, so the order to make law is directly derived from the Constitution and not from the Constitutional Court decision. The Constitutional Court's decision only resulted to be followed-up, but not an order for the legislator.
Fourth, the legitimacy process in the separation power schemes should be part of the Constitutional Court's procedures. Especially if the judicial review of the law is a form of deliberative democracy conducted by the Constitutional Court, then the principle of all parties views and opinions must be heard shall be actually done. This principle takes precedence over the legislators, so it is not appropriate to review legislation without hearing any statements from the legislator even though by reason of urgency. In the cases referred to as the use of the ID cards and in any similar cases such as the use of the right to vote, without hearing the statements of the legislator is a violation of the principle of the audi et altera partem.
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